From 1999 to 2004 the European Union had in place a moratorium on new genetically modified (GM) products. This moratorium created a tense trade dispute between the United States and the EU. While the moratorium has now been lifted, differences remain between the EU's and US's approach to GM products. The essence of the conflict involves differing approaches to the rate of technological transfer. The US advocates a rapid rate of technological transfer, while the EU advocates a slow and cautious rate. The EU's 'proceed slowly' approach is grounded in the controversial precautionary principle (PP). Crudely, the PP places the burden of proof on the developers of new technologies like GM to show that their products do not pose a threat to human health or the environment. While the PP has grown in influence in Europe over the last three decades policymakers in the US have largely rejected it. The following enquiry will examine the justifications for these conflicting perspectives on precaution toward technological transfer of GM, or transgenic research. The ultimate goal is to shed light on the role of policymakers in dealing with the uncertainties associated with this new and powerful technology.
Introduction: the conflict between the EU and US over biotechnology
In 1999 the European Union (EU) initiated a five-year moratorium on the approval of new genetically modified (GM) products. The moritorium was lifted in 2004. The US government considered the moratorium to constitute a trade violation under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. Moreover, the US repeatedly threatened to bring a case against the EU before the WTO because the EU's de facto ban on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) was costing US companies millions of dollars annually in agricultural exports.
Consequently, many US politicians are angry. For example, in March of 2003, House Speaker Dennis Hastert repeated the call for action against the EU.
1 No doubt Hastert's motivation has something to do with the fact that his home state of Illinois exports approximately $2.7 billion of corn and soybeans each year. Thirty-four percent of the corn crop and 75% of the soybean crop consists of GMOs. Speaking before the House Agriculture Committee, Hastert remarked:
" As [the House Ag Committee] is well aware, the EU has had an indefensible moratorium on GM products in place for over four years with no end in sight . . . This is a non-tariff barrier based simply on prejudice and misinformation, not sound science."
Like Hastert, many politicians, industry leaders and scientists are worried that the genomic revolution in agriculture will never be fully realised if the EU does not embrace this new technology. Indeed, that many countries around the world are following Europe's lead in exercising precaution toward GM products.
The current state of affairs
The commercial adoption of GM crops over the last decade has been one of the most rapid cases of technological transfer and diffusion in the history of agriculture. Now this movement has nearly halted (Borlaug, 2000) . For example, a newspaper headline in the autumn of 2001 read: 'No Bumper Crop of Genetically Modified Plants. ' (Beise, 2001) The article goes on to note how large international agribusinesses are radically revising their expectations for this new technology: 'Faced with high risks and consumer skepticism, biotech firms pull back from plans to transform farming. ' (Beise, 2001 ) So the biotech revolution in agriculture is now largely on hold, and a major reason for this is the EU's precautionary approach to GM policy. Whether or not the EU's cautious approach is based on prejudice, misinformation and bad science, as Hastert and others charge, will be one of the important issues addressed in this article. As will be seen, both the arguments for rapidly advancing the biotech (GM) revolution and for a slow, cautious approach are multiple, complex and rational.
The following caricature illustrates the current state of affairs described above, in the summer of 2003. Imagine a political cartoon with a bus labelled, 'The GM Revolution.' At the steering wheel are two enormous drivers trying to occupy a seat that would barely accommodate either of them alone. One driver is labelled 'the US Congress' while the other is labelled 'the European Commission'. The rotund US driver has his foot full on the gas. The portly EC has his foot full on the brake. The result is a predictable amount of lurching, jostling and straining. Further, the bus is filled with a cacophony of commands being issued by the passengers. On one side of the bus are a group of industry leaders and scientists who are calling for the bus to go forward. On the other side is a group of consumer activists, environmentalists, scientists and advocates of organic farming calling for the bus to stop. In the back of the bus are European consumers; they are telling the EC to keep pressing that brake pedal. Next to this group are US consumers, who, for the most part, are placidly staring out of the windows.
Standing outside the bus, observing this strange scene is a collection of developing-world farmers, who look concerned and befuddled.
This vignette is designed to illustrate the question at hand, which is brought into sharp relief by the conflict between the US and the EU: What is the role of policymakers in dealing with the uncertainties of research in plant genomics and its applications? The bus drivers represent competing answers to this question. In essence, the two drivers disagree on how fast and how far we should go with this revolutionary new technology. They disagree on the appropriate rate of technological transfer (i.e. the movement of scientific discoveries from the lab to the marketplace). Hence, one way of framing the question concerning the role of policymakers in dealing with the uncertainties inherent in GM research is in terms of their ethical responsibilities in regulating the rate of technological transfer. Common sense seems to indicate that if the rate of technological transfer is fast, then the impact of GM will be greater, but so will the risks. As indicated, US policymakers tend toward rapid technological transfer, while the trend in Europe is toward slow, highly limited, or no, technological transfer. The enquiry that follows will examine the justifications for these two, conflicting approaches.
The precautionary principle and technological transfer
The warrants for these different approaches are backed by competing philosophies on how policymakers ought to manage the health and environmental risks associated with GM. On the one hand, the US has chosen to treat GM under the existing scientifically based paradigm for risk assessment. On the other, the EU has chosen a supposedly new, ethically enlightened paradigm based on the precautionary principle (PP).
Briefly, application of the PP in this context places a greater burden of proof on the biotech industry to demonstrate that its products are safe. An important consequence of applying the PP to GM policy is to slow the rate of technological transfer. It follows that by choosing not to apply the PP policymakers in the US are in effect supposing that the right course of action is relatively rapid technological transfer. The US government prefers to pursue the benefits of GM and deal with the unintended health or environmental consequences if, or when, they arise. In contrast, it follows that by choosing to apply the PP policymakers in the EU are in effect supposing that the right course of action is to slow, or stop, technological transfer. The EC thinks it is better to play it safe with public health and the environment than to realise the benefits of GM. In sum, by applying the PP as a justification of GM regulation, the EU's approach is 'Better to be safe than sorry.' While the US' is 'Nothing ventured nothing gained. ' (Van Den Belt and Gremmen, 2002) As far as it goes, both of these adages are reasonable warrants for public policy. However, the question is, which one should be applied to GM regulation? Should policymakers promote a slow or a rapid rate of technological transfer of GM?
In an effort to answer this question, the following enquiry will be divided into two parts and a conclusion, each of which responds to a general question. Part 1 answers the question: What are the warrants and backings of the main arguments for and against rapid technological transfer of genomic research in agriculture? Part 2 explores the question: How are the arguments addressed in Part 1 related to the precautionary principle? Drawing from the answers to the questions in Part 1 and Part 2, the conclusion responds to the question: What is the role of policymakers in dealing with the uncertainties of research and development in plant genomics?
4 Arguments for and against rapid technological transfer
The promise of plant genomics
Before surveying and analysing the main arguments for and against rapid technological transfer of GM, I will begin with a brief summary of what is taking place in research and development in plant genomics. The main focus in this area of biotechnology is the creation of transgenic (GM) crops, which consist of plants that contain a gene or genes that have been artificially inserted from an unrelated plant or different species. The genetic modification (GM) of plants (or more accurately, the transgenic modification) is widely regarded as having the capability of generating a technological revolution in agriculture. For example, this view is evident in a 1984 Office of Technological Assessment statement on the potential of the emerging biotech industry.
The report states:
" Biotechnology has the technical breadth and depth to change the industrial community of the 21st century because of its potential to produce substantially unlimited of quantities of:
• products never before available • products that are currently in short supply • products that cost substantially less than products made by existing methods of production
• products that are safer than those now available, and • products made with new materials that may be more plentiful and less expensive than those now used."
" By virtue of its wide-reaching potential applications, biotechnology lies close to the centre of many of the world's major problems -malnutrition, disease, energy availability and cost, and pollution." (OTA) Accordingly, proponents of GM see it as having the potential to create wealth through the development of novel products and offering new possibilities for dealing with some of humanity's most chronic problems. Given the above assessment, it is easy to see why the US government and the international agricultural and biochemical industries made a strong commitment to the biotech revolution. One of the first important transgenic crops was made by inserting a bacteria gene into corn to make the crop 'pest-proof' (Charles, 2001, p.41) . It has been known since the early part of the 20th century that a certain soil bacterium, (Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)) is toxic to caterpillars. (Ironically, this discovery was made when the bacteria was causing an epidemic in the Japanese silkworm industry in 1910 (Charles, p.42)) In the early days of transgenic research, when scientists were searching for useful genes to insert into important crops, Bt quickly came to mind. It was reasoned that if the Bt gene responsible for producing the toxin in the soil bacterium, which had been isolated in the early 1980s, could be spliced into commercial crops, these modified plants would also produce this toxin in every cell. This would then reduce reliance on expensive and environmentally hazardous industrial insecticides. Also, this technology promised to make millions of dollars for the agricultural industry. Scientists succeeded in splicing the Bt gene into several crops, which were enthusiastically received by US farmers. For example, one year after Bt corn was placed on the market in the US in 1996, it represented about 5% of the domestic crop; in 1998 the proportion had risen to 25%; in 1999 it was 35%. Due at least in part to the EU's moratorium, in 2000 and 2001 the percentage of Bt corn fell back to 25% (Hart, 2002) .
With this brief introduction in mind, it is now time to turn to the arguments for and against rapid technological transfer of GM. In what follows, I have identified three main arguments for rapid technological transfer and two lines for slow, or no, technological transfer. Neither the list of arguments nor the analysis is intended to be exhaustive, but merely representative.
Arguments for rapid technological transfer

Argument #1: The humanitarian argument
The humanitarian argument asserts that we must vigorously pursue GM because technological progress in agriculture is necessary for feeding the rapidly expanding world population. In general, humanitarian agronomists who advance this argument believe that for agriculture to keep pace with population growth the yield ceiling must be raised, and this can only be done by scientific innovations, most prominently GM.
Norman Borlaug is the most influential humanitarian agronomist advocating this argument. In the 1950s and 1960s Borlaug spearheaded the development of high-yielding varieties of wheat while working as a researcher in Mexico. This sparked the 'Green Revolution'. More specifically, the techniques Borlaug developed in Mexico allowed much of Southeast Asia to feed itself, thus avoiding widespread famine in the 1960s and 1970s. He was awarded the Noble Peace Prize for this work in 1970. 2 It is clear that Borlaug, and perhaps a majority of scientists working on agricultural research, tout the 'Green Revolution' as an exemplar of how to understand the puzzles of agricultural science. That is, the problems of agriculture are to be solved through intensive scientific research and rapid technological transfer rather than through less technologically intensive organic farming. In an article titled: 'Ending World Hunger: The Promise of Biotechnology and the Threat of Anti-Science Zealotry', Borlaug writes that, "For the genetic improvement of food crops to continue at a pace sufficient to meet the needs of the 8.3 billion people projected to be on this planet at the end of the next quarter century, both conventional and biotechnology are needed." (Borlaug, 2000) The grounds for Borlaug's argument are a list of potential ways GM crops might help accomplish the goal of ending world hunger. For example, he mentions 'cereal varieties with greater tolerance for soil alkalinity, free aluminium, and iron toxicity' (Borlaug, 2000) . These GMOs might allow productive agriculture to continue in marginal soils or those that have been degraded by irrigation. Along these same lines, Borlaug points to GM crops that might be able to grow in acidic soils, thus expanding the area of arable land (Borlaug, 2000) . Also, there is the potential to create plants that can handle greater extremes in drought, heat and cold, as well as plants that use fertilisers more efficiently. In the last case, Borlaug cites a transgenic variety of wheat with a 29% increase in yield with the same amount of fertiliser (Borlaug, 2000) . In addition, there are possibilities for developing GM crops with resistance to viral and fungal disease. Finally, a potential benefit of GM crops is improved nutritional value.
One noteworthy example of this last possibility is the much-heralded 'golden rice'. Millions of people in developing countries suffer from impaired vision, increased susceptibility to diarrhea, respiratory diseases and measles due to a deficiency of Vitamin A in their diets. In many of parts of the world rice, which is not a source of Vitamin A, is the staple. Swiss researchers have inserted a daffodil gene and a gene from bacteria to produce rice capable of synthesising beta-carotene, the precursor of Vitamin A (Borlaug, 2000) . The benefits of 'golden rice' have yet to be realised, but this possibility for improving the lives of millions of people is frequently cited by proponents of GM. With potential developments such as those indicated above, many scientists are joining Borlaug and in heralding a new 'Green Revolution' powered by biotechnology. Of course, as will be seen, there are critics of the first 'Green Revolution', who staunchly oppose another agricultural revolution moving in the same direction.
Hence, the grounds that are offered to support the humanitarian argument are the potential of GMOs to solve the problems of modern agricultural science. The warrant for the argument, to borrow a term from Paul Thompson, is 'productionism' . Productionism might be taken to be the norm, or principle, of modern agricultural sciences. It indicates that the way to solve the world's ever-growing need for food and fibre is through scientific research aimed at increasing productivity and lowering costs. 3 Thompson summarises the goal of productionism as to make 'two blades grow where one grew before'. 4 However, what is the basis for the 'principle of productionism'? In general, the backing for productionism is inferred from a heroic reading of the history and evolution of modern agriculture. In the productionist reading of this history, the many technological revolutions in Western agriculture are each advances that have had a profound, positive effect on human history. For instance, in the 18th century there was the introduction of mechanised agriculture . In the 19th there was the discovery of the chemical requirements of plants and the Haber-Bosch process, which at a crucial point in our history allowed us to fix atmospheric nitrogen and to manufacture ammonia.
This freed agriculture from the limits of traditional sources of nitrogen fertilisers in manures and gave birth to the agricultural chemical industry . In the 20th century there was the development of plant genetics along with the discoveries of highly effective herbicides and pesticides . At the beginning of the 21st century the major innovation is transgenics, which fits into this history as a timely and welcome innovation with the power to transform agriculture once again for the betterment of humanity. According to Borlaug, '[Genetic modification] is the progressive harnessing of the forces of nature to the benefit of feeding the human race.' (Borlaug, 2000) All of these discoveries culminated in 'progressive', modern, industrial agriculture.
As will be seen in later arguments, others have a different reading of this history. Nonetheless, these technological transformations in agriculture have assuredly saved millions from malnutrition and starvation. That is, vast potential 'die-backs' in the human population have been avoided or postponed because of technological advances in agriculture that have increased yields. Anthony Trewavas writes:
" The lessons of history are clear. Successive lurches in population numbers have driven the development of new agricultural technologies designed to provide food for growing populations. This process of discovery will continue until there is an abundance of food equally enjoyed by the whole world population." Hence, in terms of productionism we are currently in a technological 'arms race' with population growth. For the humanitarian agronomists the price of detente is inhumane. Per Pinstrup-Anderson and Ebbe Schiøler warn that, 'Once again Malthus's clash between population growth and food production looms threateningly on the horizon, particularly in Africa. Thus, the argument is advanced that, because yield ceilings have not been raised by existing techniques, GM is acutely needed if we are to feed an additional 2.3 billion people in the next 25 years and 2 billion more by 2050. 5 It follows, then, from the Humanitarian argument that rapid technological transfer of GM must be vigorously pursued.
Argument #2: The environmental argument
There are two lines of argument for rapid technological transfer of plant genomics from the standpoint of the environment. The first is that GMOs will help reduce dependence on environmentally dangerous chemicals. The second is that GMOs will help save the wilderness by decreasing the need for additional agricultural lands by increasing yields on existing lands.
Turning to the first line of argument, many genetic engineers received their PhDs during the 1970s, when environmentalism was at its peak (Charles, 2001, p.25) . These scientists came of age in a world where the hazards of agricultural chemicals were widely known through the popularity of works such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. Daniel Charles, in his excellent book on the history of the biotech industry, comments that, "These young genetic engineers did believe that their work would be good for the planet, possibly making it easier to grow food or reducing agriculture's dependence on chemicals . . . [They believed that] chemicals represented the dirty and regrettable past, and biology was the savior." (Charles, 2001, pp.24-25) The warrant for this line of argument is that GM crops will be better for the environment by reducing the amount of industrial chemicals (e.g. pesticides, herbicides, fertilisers) used in agriculture. Anthony Trewavas articulates this position when he asserts that 'now is the time to reduce the undoubted side effects from pesticides, soil erosion, nitrogen waste, and salination. GM technology certainly offers some good solutions.' (Trewavas, 2001, pp.174-179) As grounds for this argument, two groups of GM crops are often cited. (It should be noted that these claims are equally often disputed.) The first group of GM crops are those engineered to contain pesticides. The second are those engineered to be herbicide tolerant. Plants containing the Bt toxin (e.g. GM corn, soybeans and cotton) are an example of the first group. It is proposed that these GM crops will greatly reduce the need for insecticides. One example of a herbicide resistant crop is engineered by Monsanto to be tolerant of the company's popular herbicide Roundup. In this case, herbicide-resistant GM crops might reduce the negative consequences of herbicides by allowing for their more efficient use.
In sum then, this line of argument is that GM crops are better for the environment than hazardous agro-chemicals. This proposition can only be established by the accumulation of a large body of empirical data, which will take time to gather and interpret. Hence, at present it is merely a likely hypothesis that is backed by some evidence, but not enough. Also, it assumes that GM is a better alternative to other methods for reducing reliance on agro-chemicals. This too is an empirical claim that would need a large amount of corroborative data. As for the grounds mentioned above there are some data to support the claim that these GM crops do reduce the need for pesticides and herbicides. However, more studies need to be done to firmly establish these grounds, more particularly on the effects of GM crops and herbicide use. Further, while GMOs may reduce the need for agro-chemicals, they may cause other problems. For example, the widespread and incautious use of plants engineered with Bt may render this fairly environmentally benign, 'organic' pesticide useless. If the evolution of pests that are resistant to the toxin is accelerated, in the long run the use of these GM crops might increase reliance on more hazardous pesticides. There will, no doubt, be some trade-offs. However, the only way to make these determinations is through careful monitoring of a wide range of GM crops over a long period of time.
The argument that GMOs are needed to save the wilderness from being cleared for agriculture is related to the warrant in the humanitarian argument: GMOs increase crop production. This line of argument states that it is necessary to increase crop efficiency to feed a growing world population without destroying more of the earth's ecosystems. Crudely stated, if no additional ecosystems are to be destroyed, scientists must find ways to feed 2 billion more people on existing agricultural lands progressively over the next 25 years. It has been estimated that these additional 2 billion people will require a 1.3% increase of food production annually (Trewavas, 2001, pp.174-179) . Taking a longer view, one scientist has calculated that to feed the world's population in 2050 using existing agricultural practices will require a 'three-fold increase in land put down to crops' (Trewavas, 2001) .
Once again, Anthony Trewavas attempts to provide backing for this view with evidence from the history of modern agriculture. He writes that, 'if we had frozen technology at 1961 levels, to feed the 6 billion in 2000 we would need to increase the cropland area by 80% (910 Mha).' (Trewavas, 2001 ) Trewavas goes on to cite similar data to establish a general historical trend: progress in agricultural technology increases crop efficiency, which has continually allowed us to produce more food on the same land. Some proponents of GM technologies argue that GM fits into this pattern of technological progress in agriculture. It is science's next step in increasing crop efficiency, thus allowing us to save the earth's remaining ecosystems while feeding its human population.
Like the Humanitarian argument, this argument is premised on the tenets of productionism. Again, there may be other ways to accomplish this goal, e.g. a change in diets in those countries that rely heavily on beef, better global food distribution, and more just trade practices. Further, as Trewavas openly acknowledges, the history of scientifically-based agriculture in terms of the environment is mixed. It has done much harm in providing us with much good. There are many who would disagree with Trewavas' assertion that the answer to the problems created by agricultural technology is more technology. 6 Moreover, the reason that many ecosystems have not been converted into crop land is because their soils are marginal, or the climate unsuitable. Hence, GM crops that are engineered to grow in marginal soils, or in previously unsuitable climate conditions, may actually increase the amount of land cleared for crop production.
Argument #3: The economic argument
Henry I. Miller is perhaps the best-known advocate of the economic argument for rapid technological transfer of plant genomics. Miller first entered the fray over genetic engineering as an official for the Food and Drug Administration during the Reagan years. For nearly 20 years he has consistently argued for minimal governmental regulation so as not to slow or stifle scientific innovation and technological transfer, which he believes to be the twin-engine of wealth creation. Presently, Miller is making this argument from the Hoover Institution, where he is a fellow.
The economic argument for rapid technological transfer of GM is well articulated in an article coauthored by Miller and Gregory Conko, entitled 'The perils of precaution' (Miller and Conko, 2001 ). The warrant for this argument is a principle that is labeled the 'income effect,' which indicates that there is a positive correlation between health and wealth (Miller and Conko, 2001 ). Miller cites the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky as popularising the notion of the 'income effect' as a policy-guiding principle. The backing for this principle is found in observations such as 'richer societies have lower mortality rates than poorer ones' (Miller and Conko, 2001 ). According to Miller, it follows that 'to deprive communities of wealth is to enhance their risks' (Miller and Conko, 2001) . He goes on to list a series of benefits that come from living in a wealthy society, including: better healthcare, more nutritious diets and less stressful lives, which lessens the instance of hypertension and heart disease (Miller and Conko, 2001) . While admitting that such figures are difficult to establish, Miller cites an estimate that 'every 7.25 million dollars in regulatory costs will induce one additional fatality through this 'income effect' (Miller and Conko, 2001 ). The essence of this argument appears to be that greater regulatory costs will keep beneficial products from consumers and reduce the amount of wealth created by new products. Thus, this supposed 'regulatory effect' would work in the opposite direction to the 'income effect'. (Of course, it seems obvious that the figures cited by Miller would need to be weighed against the number of fatalities avoided for the same regulatory costs.)
In order for Miller's argument to be complete, he would need to provide evidence that GMOs do lead to wealth creation and, hence, higher standards of living and better health. Such evidence could only be gathered after the fact, so the grounds for Miller's argument are based on a hypothetical scenario.
By way of summary, the economic argument for rapid technological transfer centres on the potential for GMOs to create wealth through novel products, etc., in accordance with the general notion of an 'income effect'. This phenomenon is supposedly backed by a great deal of data that correlate health with wealth. Therefore, the 'income effect' warrants taking chances with health and environmental risks associated with GM because the risks of not developing products that can produce so much wealth is far greater. This, of course, implies the minimum possible regulatory regime, which is in direct opposition to the tenets of the PP. For Miller, the EC's use of the PP to justify the moratorium on new GM products was one of the most egregious examples of regulatory overkill (Miller and Conko, 2001) . It goes without saying that many will oppose this argument in such a sweeping form. Moreover, some will oppose it for its extreme anthropocentrism; i.e. its narrow focus on human concerns views the nonhuman world exclusively in instrumental terms.
Summary of arguments 1-3
The warrants for all three of the arguments for rapid technological transfer depend on an overall optimistic interpretation of the history of modern technology. Scientific innovation and technological transfer has allowed us to feed an ever-increasing world population, solve environmental problems caused by technology, and generate wealth that leads to higher standards of living and better health. GM is seen as a natural extension of these progressive historical trends.
However, while there has been a strong faith in scientific and technological progress since the advent of the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution, there is increasing scepticism about technological progress. For example, in a European study on attitudes toward biotechnology, many of those surveyed were ambivalent toward the notion of scientific and technological progress (Marris et al., 2002) . They reported being satisfied with modern standards of hygiene and food made possible by technological advances, but that did not follow that technology would necessarily make their lives better. Further, they felt GM might be going too far in this trajectory, and they did not see the need for GM products. For example, one respondent commented that, 'there is no need to accelerate the process of industrialisation within our countries, when food choices are already overwhelming.' (Marris et al., 2002) It is this general ambivalence toward, and even rejection of, the idea of technological progress that is driving the arguments that will be looked at in the next section for slow, or no, technological transfer of GM.
Arguments for slow, or no, technological transfer
Argument #4: The unintended consequences argument
Environmental thought over the last 40 years or so has tended to reject technological progress as a normative ideal. For example, the popular environmental writer, Bill McKibben's recently published a book entitled Enough, in which he argues against an insatiable hunger for more and more technology. One of his targets is genetic engineering (McKibben, 2003) . Rather than the Enlightenment ideal of progress through science and technology, many environmental thinkers champion various notions of sustainability. There are many conceptions of 'sustainability'. They can range from holistic, ecocentric-based on norms such as Aldo Leopold's call for homo sapiens to learn to fit into natural systems while disrupting them as little as possible. Or, they can be more human orientated, like Byron Norton's statement of the 'sustainability principle', which holds that, 'each generation has an obligation to protect productive ecological and physical processes necessary to support options necessary for future human freedom and welfare.' (Norton, 1996) Whatever the notion of sustainability, most are opposed to the current trend that seeks to control 'nature' through ever more powerful and invasive technology. Hence, the trend is more toward 'soft' technologies aimed at sustainable agriculture and organic farming, as opposed to transgenics, which is associated, fairly, or not, with unsustainable industrial monoculture.
One important warrant for this line of argument is the 'law of unintended consequences'. This general principle is drawn from an alternative, pessimistic reading of the history of technology. The following comment by Mac Ehrardt, a Minnesota seed supplier interviewed by Daniel Charles in his book on the biotech industry, provides some indication that this way of thinking is embraced by many people. He says that, 'I think there's a law of unintended consequences with technology, whether it is nuclear power or biotechnology.' (Charles, 2001, p.177) Edward Tenner's book, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, is representative of how people find backing for this warrant. This book is a chronicle of unintended consequences from modern technologies. For instance, there are chapters devoted to 'revenge effects' in such areas of as industrial agricultural (e.g. an extended section on DDT) and modern biomedicine (e.g. an extended section on antibiotic resistance). This chronicling of 'revenge effects' does supply impressive backing for the notion that there is, if not a law, an inherent tendency in technological transfer for things to go wrong in unexpected ways.
In addition to these empirical arguments, Tenner makes some brief remarks that are indicative of the kinds of theoretical support for a 'law of unintended consequences.' In a short section early in the book, Tenner suggests that Mary Shelley's Frankenstein provides an important insight into why the 'revenge effect' is pervasive. He writes:
"Mary Shelley was pointing to a dilemma of all science-based technology -at a time when science was only starting to influence technological practice. How can we understand a system before we start to change it? " (Charles, 2001, p.12) Later he writes: "Frankenstein's fateful error was to consider everything but the sum of the parts he had assembled." (Charles, 2001) Tenner is drawing attention to the fact that in technological transfer we move from a setting that is more or less a controlled, closed system in the laboratory to an open, complex dynamic in the real world. The real world is a nesting of interconnected natural and cultural systems, with far too many contingencies to predict all possible consequences. Hence, in the real world, it is impossible to be certain what exactly will happen in technological transfer. There are generally surprises, or unintended consequences.
In regard to more specific support for a law of unintended consequences in industrial agriculture, Rachel Carson's Silent Spring serves as a paradigm. 7 Ever since the publication of Silent Spring there has been a steady stream of books documenting human shortsightedness in the applications of agricultural technologies affecting the environment and public health. These critiques reinforce a strong sense of inductive pessimism about the future of scientifically based agriculture. From this perspective, then, it is not a matter of whether unintended consequences of GM crops will happen; rather, it is a question of when, where and how bad.
Therefore, with the law of unintended consequences in mind, when GMOs were introduced concerned scientists began looking for evidence of such consequences -if they were found, they could serve as grounds to justify slow, or no, technological transfer. For example, using Carson's critique of DDT as an example, one unintended consequence of the use of pesticides is harm to non-target species. In a much discussed and debated experiment, John Losey and his colleagues at Cornell University asked if corn pollen containing Bt toxins might scatter onto milkweeds that grow around corn fields (Losey et al., 1999) . If the milkweeds were to become coated with the toxin containing pollen, then they might kill monarch butterfly larva, which feed on the milkweeds. In the lab, Losey and his colleagues coated milkweed leaves with transgenic corn pollen. The results of the experiment were that 44% of the monarch larva died when they ate milkweed coated with pollen from the GM corn, while none died as a result of eating the milkweed coated with pollen from non-GM corn. (Marvier) The authors did not claim to show GM corn will ultimately harm monarch butterfly populations in the fields, but the study raised concerns.
To summarise, the warrant for the argument in favour of the 'law of unintended consequences' is a general claim about the dangers of technological transfer, as new technologies are moved from the closed system in the lab into the complex, open system of the real world. Currently, there are several experiments that serve as grounds for this argument. However, like the experiment on Monarch butterflies and GM corn mentioned above, in every case the conclusions of these experiments are highly controversial. Nonetheless, in an effort to find such grounds scientists are investigating various possible unintended consequences from GM. For example, it is feared that transgenic genes will introgress into wild relatives. 8 This could create unintended GM plants that would be harmful to non-target species, weeds that are resistant to herbicides, or possibly a loss of biodiversity. It is known that 12 of 13 of the world's most important crops hybridise with wild relatives. Once again, at present all of these grounds are disputed. Further, in fairness, the record of unintended consequences of modern technology must be balanced against its positive record.
Argument #5: The environmental justice argument
The final argument in this survey is the argument for slow or no technological transfer of plant genomics based on environmental justice. Those who advocate this line of argument champion more traditional farming practices, which they believe are more 'biologically sound and economically just' than the practices of large, corporate farms (Berry, 2002) . Further, they oppose the 'principle of productionism' (to make 'two blades grow where one grew before') that warrants Argument #1. For instance, the best-known advocate of this line of argument in the US is the writer Wendell Berry, who comments that, " This exclusive emphasis on production will accelerate the mechanisation and chemicalisation of farming, increasing the price of land, increasing overhead and production costs, and thereby diminishing the farming population. Thus the tendency . . . is to complete deliverance of US agriculture into the hands of corporations. The cost of this corporate totalitarianism in energy, land and social disruption will be enormous." (Berry, 1997) As can be seen, Berry has a pessimistic interpretation of the history of modern technologically-driven agriculture. Specifically, Berry's focus is on a general regressive trend where small farmers are increasingly driven off the land by large corporate farms. This process destroys traditional, rural ways of life that were purportedly better integrated into the earth's ecosystems and much more conducive to promoting human virtues and economic justice. Hence, the warrant for the environmental justice argument is derived from this pessimistic reading of the history of modern agriculture. It roughly states that there is an inverse relationship between technological 'progress' in agriculture as measured by 'productism' and ecologically sound and economically just farming practices.
The most well known advocate of this argument against GM is the Indian scientist and activist Vandana Shiva. In contrast to the humanitarian agronomists' interpretation of the Green Revolution as averting tragedy, Shiva maintains that it has had tragic consequences for India. From her perspective, the Green Revolution began a process of corporatisation of Indian farming. The high-yield varieties of wheat Borlaug introduced into India require large quantities of chemical fertilisers and irrigation to produce high yields. These plants pushed Indian agriculture in the direction of expensive, technologically-intensive monoculture. Many small farmers could not adapt, nor could they compete with Green Revolution farming techniques and were thus driven out of business. Hence, the process of industrial farming has forced peasant farmers, who once made an independent living, to sell their farms and to become migrant workers on the large corporate farms. Shiva believes this process has 'destroyed diverse sources of food, and it has stolen food from other species to bring larger quantities of specific commodities to the market, using huge quantities of fossil fuels and water and toxic chemicals in the process.' (Shiva, 2000, p.12) In sum, agrarian advocates for environmental justice, like Shiva and Berry, argue that the productionism mentioned in Argument #1 leads to monocultures and corporate 'totalitarianism', as opposed to a truly democratic agriculture and culture . So rather than being the next, life-saving technology, arriving on the scene just in time to rescue billions from imminent famine, GM will further intensify this trend. However, can traditional farming practices provide enough food to feed an additional 2 billion people in the next 25 years? This hypothesis would need to be supported, unless we are willing to let millions go without food. Also, currently a few giant corporations control the GM seed market, a fact that provides strong grounds for Shiva's argument. However, there is no necessary connection between GM and corporate domination of farming. For example, many of the advocates of the Humanitarian Argument see the dominance of large corporations over GM technology as an obstacle to realising the benefits of plant genomics. They would argue that this is the problem, not GM. Rather, they assert that this technology holds much promise for helping developing world farmers.
With this survey of the major arguments for and against rapid technological transfer of plant genomics in mind, the next step is to see how they are related to the PP. It will be recalled from the introduction that by not applying the PP the implication is that the US government is committed to rapid technological transfer. Hence, it must believe that it is better to pursue the benefits of GM and deal with the unintended health or environmental consequences if, or when, they arise. Arguments 1-3 are intended to support this position. By applying the PP, the implication is that the EC is committed to slow technological transfer. Hence, it must believe that it is better to play it safe with public health and the environment, than to realise the benefits of GM. Arguments 4 and 5 are intended to support this position.
The preceding brief summary of important lines of argument for and against rapid technological transfer, together with the following discussion on the PP, will ultimately help analyse the role of the policymakers in dealing with the uncertainties in the technological transfer plant genomics. Toward that end, the next section on the PP will begin by discussing the development of the different perspectives on the PP and implications for technological transfer in EU and US policy.
The precautionary principle and technological transfer
The growing emphasis on precaution in EU policy
To recall from the introduction, the general idea behind the PP is that policymakers should err on the side of caution when faced with scientific uncertainty and when serious public health or environmental risks are suspected. Over the last several decades the PP has become increasingly important in European public health and environmental policy. References to PP first emerged in European health and environmental policy during the 1970s. Prior to that time, the burden of proof in establishing regulations was on conservationists and activists to scientifically demonstrate that harm has or will happen (MacGavin, 2001) . In other words, new technologies were 'considered innocent until proven guilty' (Raffensperger and Tickner). By contrast, under a strong application of the PP new technologies are considered 'guilty until proven innocent.' In an effort to better understanding of the PP, I will briefly survey two notable instances where it has been applied by European policymakers: legislation aimed at protecting the North Sea ecosystems and a policy designed to protect the health of EU citizens by banning the import of US and Canadian hormone-fed beef.
One of the first articulations of the PP in international environmental policy was in the 'The Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (1984)'. The convention was 'designed to protect the fragile North Sea ecosystem from further degradation due to the persistent input of toxic substances' (Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) . The declaration contains an early statement of the PP. It reads:
"Accepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence." (Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) What is revolutionary here is that it is not necessary to scientifically establish clear lines of causation before regulatory action is taken. This has generated substantial criticism of the PP. Specifically, since the PP warrants regulatory action based on scientific hypotheses that predict harm but which have not been fully investigated, opponents contend that it is not based on 'sound science. ' The second example of an application of the PP is the EU's ban on US and Canadian beef exports. The ban was instituted because of health concerns about the safety of cattle fattened by injecting them with growth hormones. In this trade dispute the EU contended that hormone residues in the beef may cause endocrine damage in humans (Scott, 1999) . One European expert on endocrine disruption clearly assumed the legitimacy of applying the PP to determine to reverse the traditional burden of proof. He offered the following statement justifying the EU's ban, saying that, 'The possible health effects from the hormones have hardly been studied -the burden of proof should lie with the US beef industry.' (Scott, 1999) In response to the ban, the US agricultural secretary at the time, Dan Glickman, offered the standard criticism of the PP, averring: 'The EU ban is not based on sound science and is wholly unjustified.' (Scott, 1999) Even though the WTO sided with the US and Canada, holding that the risks of endocrine disruption was low, the EU believed that the PP justified banning hormone-fed beef without clear evidence of harm. Alex Scott summarises the situation: 'Such disputes hinge on each side's interpretation of science, and on the threshold for action. Europe is rapidly lowering its threshold.' (Scott, 1999) Thus, over approximately the last 30 years the PP has been increasingly applied in the EU (Myhr and Traavik, 2002) . The use of the PP indicates a change of values in Europe where protection of public health, the environment, and local farmers has assumed greater salience vis-à-vis economic growth. In affirmation of this trend, in February 2000 the European Commission (EC) released a significant communication on the PP (CEC, 2000) . One of the goals of the communication was to defend the EC's use of the PP against the charge that the PP was being used as a pretext for protectionism, specifically in regard to the now ended moratorium on new GMOs. It is clear that the EU is not backing away from the PP in the face of US opposition as of the summer of 2003. Rather, the communication attempts to address criticisms of its use of the PP by affirming its importance for public health and environmental policy (Myhr and Traavik, 2002, p.74) . Once again, the consequence of the increased application of the PP is a slower rate of technological transfer. In contrast, the trend in the US over the same period has aimed at increasing the rate of technological transfer.
The growing emphasis on rapid technological transfer in US policy
While public policy in the US has put more emphasis on environmental considerations ever since the 1960s; at the same time there has been a trend to increase the rate of rapid technological transfer. At that time, there was a sense in the US that its industry was falling behind. The problem was diagnosed as a failure of 'American industry to maintain an innovative climate and make use of scientific breakthroughs.' (Krimsky, 1991, p.20) In response, a group of politicians, industrial leaders and university administrators set out to create the conditions for science to become a more dynamic engine of economic growth. This was to be effectuated by increasing the rate of technological transfer. The US Congress passed a series of legislative acts aimed at increasing the rate of technological transfer by removing barriers between industry and the academy. 9 This body of legislation has been characterised as the Marshall Plan for research and development (Krimsky, 1991) . The most famous and far reaching of these laws is the controversial Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendment, which allows universities to patent and license discoveries made from publicly funded research. 10 However, Bayh-Dole alone was insufficient impetus for the biotech revolution. Of even more importance was the US Supreme Court ruling in 1980 that 'a human-modified microorganism can be classified a product of manufacture, and thus falls under patent protection.' 10 The ability to patent GMOs increases the rate of technological transfer by providing incentives for their development.
Thus, in the early 1980s the Reagan Administration, the US Congress and the Supreme Court created the conditions for putting the biotech revolution on the fast track of rapid technological transfer. Since the PP works to slow technological transfer, it is not surprising that the PP is not expressly mentioned in US laws or policies (Bruce, 2002) . 11, 12 It should also be noted that the biotech industry emerged during the Reagan administration at a time when government regulation was out of favour (Charles, 2001, p.28) . In the 1980s neither the biotech industry nor the Reagan administration wanted a new regulatory regime for GM (Charles, 2001, p.28) . Industry thought it wise to have GMOs regulated, but only by modifying existing protocols. The basic schema adopted was that if industry could demonstrate that a new GMO was chemically analogous ('equivalent') to the crop plant from which it is derived, then it would not raise new regulatory problems. This principle, termed 'substantial equivalence', allows GMOs to be treated like their 'natural' antecedent, if it is shown that the two organisms are substantially equivalent. Substantial equivalence is demonstrated by crosschecking a sampling of macro-and micronutrients to ascertain if they are the same. If they correspond, then the GMO is deemed safe by analogy except for the protein(s) expressed by the inserted gene(s), its markers and vectors, which are tested in isolation (Millstone et al., 1999) .
This principle " signaled to the GM food industry that as long as companies did not try to make GM foods that had grossly different chemical composition from those foods already on the market, their new GM products would be permitted without any safety or toxicological tests." (Millstone et al., 1999) For example, if a GM corn containing a bacteria gene is shown to be 'substantially equivalent' to its non-GM antecedent organism, then they face no additional regulatory hurdles. This approach assumes that GMOs are unlikely to give rise to unintended consequences that will be fundamentally different than those associated with traditional crops. Hence, regulation of GMOs was subsumed under existing Food and Drug Administration and Department of Agriculture policies, an approach that relies on scientifically establishing clear links between a new product and harmful effects prior to instituting new regulations. This, of course, is a different standard than under the PP. From the above, it is evident that there is a clear philosophical gap between the EU and the US on how to deal with the uncertainties of genomic research in agriculture. These differences are brought into sharp relief by examining the sources of the conflict over the PP. The hypothesis presented above is: On the one hand, the US's motivation for rejecting the PP is due to a commitment to a rapid technological transfer, which is aimed at realising the benefits of new technologies and economic development. It is in this light that US policymakers view the PP as unscientific, overcautious and unnecessary. On the other hand, the EU's motivation for applying the PP is a desire to protect the environment, public health and local agriculture. It is this light that the EU sees the PP as an ethically enlightened way to manage the scientific uncertainty inherent in new technologies. How this difference is resolved will determine the immediate future of the biotech revolution, if not its long-term prospects.
But which side in the debate has adopted the more reasonable and ethical approach? How should we deal with the scientific uncertainties inherent in this new and powerful technology? Should the policymaker use or eschew the PP? In order to answer these questions it will be necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the PP.
Risk, uncertainty and GM crops
One of the reasons given for not applying the PP in the context of GMOs is that their potential benefits are great and the risks associated with them are small. Conversely, one of the reasons advanced in favour of applying the PP is that the benefits of GMOs are uncertain and the risks are great. Paul Thompson notes that, "The difference of opinion between advocates of biotechnology and opponents boils down to differing estimates of the probability and degree of harm, and value of compensating benefits. The difference of opinion depends largely on issues that can only be settled by empirical inquiry. It is the expense and difficulty of gathering the data to settle the issues that keeps them alive." (Thompson, 1995, p.38) Framed this way, the dispute is more a scientific issue than an ethical one. However, as Thompson observes, it is difficult and expensive for science to decide these issues.
Indeed, it is likely an insurmountable task to provide definitive calculations of the risks associated with the widespread release of GMOs into the environment. Michelle Marvier comments:
"To be completely assured of the ecological safety of a transgenic [i.e. GM] crop would require many experiments: testing transgenic plants in different environmental conditions, at different times of the year, in combination with different farming practices and examining the effects of the plants and plant by-products on an enormous number of species that could potentially be affected by transgenic crops. Clearly, attaining this level of certainty is neither reasonable nor possible . . . Consequently, we must decide how we will deal with the unavoidable uncertainty that accompanies transgenic crops." (Marvier, 2001) In a similar vein, Julie Hill remarks:
" Determining probability of realisation of a hazard [from a GMO] is effectively impossible. There are so many different variables in terms of the environmental factors that could make a difference that putting numbers to any one of them is a meaningless exercise." (Hill, 1994) If Marvier and Hill are right, then precise, scientifically based risk assessment for GM crops, at this stage of our experience with GMOs, is problematic. Risk is normally calculated as the product of the probability of some consequence happening multiplied by its expected utility. See Figure 1 , below: Figure 1 Risk (Myhr and Traavik, 2002, p.74) However, calculating the probability of a particular negative consequences of widespread release of GMOs into the environment is not possible. Moreover, as was seen earlier in the discussion of Argument #4, opponents of GM are concerned about unintended consequences; it is, of course, impossible to assign probability to an unintended consequence. Thus, scientifically-based risk assessment is unlikely ever to satisfy opponents of GM, whose opposition is based on unintended consequences. Therefore, given that efforts to assess the risks associated with GMOs accurately are unlikely to be successful at this stage of development, then the challenge is to find other reasonable approaches to deal with the 'unavoidable uncertainty' that accompanies GM.
Common sense and precaution
One way of dealing with this uncertainty is to acknowledge that it is reasonable to make decisions by balancing benefit scenarios with risk scenarios, even if precise probabilities and utilities cannot be calculated. Such scenarios can be judged to be either farfetched and sketchy, at one extreme, or believable and detailed, at the other. These judgements interact with additional considerations, such as whether or not the consequences predicted by the scenarios range from catastrophic and permanent to mild and reversible, on the positive side, or spectacular and long-term to modest and short-term, on the negative. Plausible benefit and risks scenarios are currently the substance of the GM debate, because we have only limited experience with GMOs compared to the possibilities this new technology opens up. Predictions of future benefits of GMOs must be balanced against predictions of future harms.
Even those who strenuously call for the debate to be based on 'sound science' present such scenarios to support their case. For example, Anthony Trewavas, a vocal advocate for GM in Europe who frequently criticises his opponents for using fuzzy science, argues that we need GMOs to counter possible consequences of global warming. One of the risk scenarios of global warming is the shutdown of the Thermohaline 'Conveyor Belt'. If the Gulf Stream stops flowing north, then many parts of Europe will become much cooler. This in turn would have a 'disastrous' effect on agriculture in many regions of Europe. Trewavas asserts that this event 'would require an agricultural revolution to be instituted in a few years' . According to Trewavas, GM technology would be essential for confronting this disaster scenario.
The reasonableness of this argument depends upon the complex interaction of several different scenarios, none of which can be assigned precise probabilities or utilities. Hence, for this argument to be persuasive the story connecting global warming to a cessation of the Gulf Stream to the collapse of European agriculture must be scientifically credible and sufficiently detailed. However, the fact that the negative consequences of this scenario are catastrophic and essentially irreversible surely lowers the standard of plausibility that we will accept to some degree. Ironically, in advancing a pro-GM argument, Trewavas is advocating precautionary action, i.e. action on the basis of suspected dangers. Finally, the persuasive power of this story depends on how tightly the case has been made that GM is likely to be a superior solution for responding to the effects of swift and dramatic climate change on agriculture, compared to other possible ways of addressing this threat.
Even if one is not persuaded by the above example, it must be admitted that we are frequently forced to make decisions based on merely plausible stories. So, while it is desirable to make judgements with the aid of as much quantitative, empirical evidence as possible, it is a truism to say that we must frequently act with incomplete evidence of future outcomes.
Below is a crude figure, presented merely for heuristic purposes, that models an intuitive, or common sense approach to balancing needs and risk to arrive at a reasonable course of action given hypothetical scenarios. Even when we are dealing with fuzzy risk and benefit/need scenarios, there are times when choices are clear: for instance, in those situations when one finds oneself well above and to the far left of the line in Figure 2 . Since need is judged to be very high and risk seems to be very low, it would be unreasonable not to act. For example, children are routinely inoculated with live virus vaccines against measles, mumps and rubella. In this case the need of preventing a potentially deadly disease greatly outweighs the minimal risk of the vaccine causing a variant of the disease. Today the risks associated with vaccinations can be calculated, however, in the past many people made the judgement to be inoculated without the aid of such numbers. One might imagine that they did so after seeing the devastating effects of these diseases, listening to the best explanation of how inoculations work and on the basis of successful inoculations. Another clear decision can be made when one is well below the line and to the far right. Since the need is low and the risk is high, it would be unreasonable to act. For example, it would be unreasonable to venture onto a busy Los Angeles freeway to retrieve a $100 bill, even if one needs the money. Finally, there are situations where it is reasonable to act even when risk is extraordinarily high, as long as the need is also extraordinary. Examples of this situation might be an organ transplant or a bone marrow transplant for cancer. Again, in the past people made these decisions at a time when there was not enough experience with these treatments to calculate probabilities of outcomes. In terms of the above model for common sense judgments of needs and risks, the PP functions to increase the slope of the 'line of decision' in Figure 2 , thus expanding the area under the line for inaction and contracting the area for action. The PP justifies a more risk-averse attitude by putting greater emphasis on empirical demonstration for risk scenarios. By justifying a risk-averse attitude, the PP is a reflection of the values of those who apply it.
One way of understanding this point is by analogy with criminal trials. The criminal justice system embodies society's belief that it is more ethical to let a guilty person go free than to send an innocent person to jail. Hence, the burden of proof may be imposed on the prosecution. One might say, that this placement of the burden of proof reflects the value society places on individual rights. Similarly, the PP indicates that it is more ethical to forego the economic benefits of a new technology than to risk harming the environment or public health. Hence, the burden of proof is on industry to show that its product is not harmful. Those who apply the PP, then, place a higher value on protecting public health and the environment than economic growth. (However, it should be recalled those proponents of Argument #3: 'The economic argument', would see this as misguided, because of the 'income effect. ') Recalling the survey of arguments presented earlier, it is informative to see how each of the argument affects Figure 2 . On the one hand, those who are persuaded by 'Environment' and 'Economic') see the history of technology in overall positive terms. Hence, they place a high value on scientific innovation and technological progress. As was shown, these arguments depend on there being historical trends in which science and technology have fed more people, allowed us to respond to the problems created by technologies, and have served as a tremendous engine for economic growth. Advocates use these trends to warrant an overall optimistic assessment about the benefits and risks associated with biotechnology. It follows, that for those who are persuaded by Arguments 1-3, the slope in Figure 2 would be relatively low.
On the other hand, those who are persuaded by Arguments 2 and 3, ('Unintended consequences' and 'Environmental justice') have a different reading of the history of modern agriculture. They see technologically intensive, industrial agriculture spawning unintended consequences leading to environmental degradation and economic injustice. Moreover, as they see it, if this trend is allowed to continue the planet will be overpopulated and severely degraded. As was noted, GM is seen as a major step in furthering this trend. Likewise, those concerned with the preservation of rural agricultural life and environmental justice see the history of technologically intensive, industrial agriculture as a story in which small farmers and farm communities have been destroyed by large industrial farms. In both Arguments 4 and 5 these historical trends are used to warrant a pessimistic assessment about the future benefits and risks of biotechnology. Hence, there is not a high value placed on technological innovation, and the slope in Figure 2 would be steep.
Finally, one last point needs to be addressed in this discussion of the PP. There is a difference in how people approach risk and benefits, as opposed to risk and needs. For instance, when something falls under the category of a need, in ordinary language it often means that the thing is necessary. Whereas, when something is categorised as a benefit it often means the thing is advantageous, but nonessential. For example, clean water is of course a need, it is necessary to life, whereas, it is beneficial, or advantageous, to drink other nutritious fluids such as fruit juice. Figure 3 is designed to illustrate this point. So unlike needs, at some point risk becomes too high to justify the pursuit of a benefit. That is, if one finds oneself to the right of the J curve above, then one would be unreasonable to act. For example, it is reasonable to risk one's life for water in order to live, but unreasonable to risk one's life for a glass of wine, when water is available.
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Figure 3 Benefits vs risk
However, it is often difficult to draw a clear line between a 'benefit' and a 'need'. For example, the CEO of a biotech firm may see a GMO as 'needed' to stay in business. A farmer might see the same GMO as beneficial, but not essential, and a consumer could easily see the GMO as neither a benefit nor a need. It is clear that it is very possible for people to classify the same thing differently in terms of needs and benefits.
In terms of the arguments surveyed earlier, those who are persuaded by Arguments 1-3 are more likely to see GM crops as needs rather than benefits. For example, those who champion the 'Humanitarian' argument see GMOs as perhaps a vital need to feed a growing population, particularly to avoid famine in places such as Africa. It is in this light that some accuse Europe of holding this needed technology 'hostage'. For example, in a Washington Post op-ed article in September of 2000, the Nigerian Minister of Agriculture wrote:
"Agricultural biotechnology holds great promise for Africa and other areas of the world where circumstances such as poverty and poor growing conditions make farming difficult . . . To deny desperate hungry people the means to control their futures by presuming to know what is best for them is not only paternalistic but morally wrong." (Pinstrup-Anderson and Schioler, 2000, p.5) Therefore, those who are convinced by the 'Humanitarian argument' may argue that GMOs may merely be a benefit in Europe and North America, they are a need in much of Africa.
However, advocates of Argument #5 ('Environmental justice') such as Vandana Shiva, see things differently. For example, in her book, Stolen Harvest, Shiva writes that, "Small farms and small farmers are being pushed to extinction, as monoculture replaces biodiversity crops, as farming is transformed from the production of nourishing and diverse foods into the creation of markets for genetically engineered seeds, herbicides, and pesticides." (Shiva, 2000, p.7) So, in the eyes of those who are convinced by the 'Environmental justice' argument, small farmers and the environment are being harmed for the benefit of large multinational corporations. As was seen earlier, Shiva sees GM as part of a new phase of colonisation of her country by large multinational agribusinesses like Monsanto.
Many Europeans share this view. Participants in a European study of public perceptions of agricultural biotechnology found that people were cynical about the marketing strategy for GMOs that portrayed them as necessary to 'feed the world'. They characterised such ads by the biotech industry as a 'manipulative marketing ploy' (Marris, 2002) . Many people feel that GMOs fall into the category of benefits and not needs. For example, a British anti-GM activist, Douglas Parr, comments that, "People are upset because they see no need for genetically engineered food. It's being pushed ahead blindly by the government, yet the hazards are potentially colossal, and irreversible." (Hart, 2002, p.16) To cite another example, a British consumer remarks that, "There are profits to the companies, benefits to the farmers, but any risks will be borne by society as a whole." (Hart, 2002, p.24) It is clear that these two people would position themselves somewhere on the right side of Figure 3 . Hence, they would have a tendency not to act even though there is no clear, scientific evidence that GMOs are harmful. By way of summary, drawing on the several discussions in this article, I would like to conclude with three general points that hopefully will shed light on the role of the policymaker in dealing with the uncertainties in plant genomics. The first point is that one of the primary roles of policymakers is to determine the rate of technological transfer. Again, it seems evident that, with a technology that has the power and range of transgenics, an increased rate of technological transfer means that more benefits can be realised sooner, but at the price of greater risks. Conversely, slowing the rate of technological transfer will promote the opposite effect. On the one hand, because the USA has put a high value on economic growth through scientific innovation, policies were instituted to increase the rate of technological transfer. This was done primarily by writing and altering patent laws and by removing barriers between publicly funded science and private business. On the other hand, because the EU has placed a high value on protecting the environment, public health and local farm culture, it has progressively adopted a precautionary approach to new technologies. Hence, the PP has been used to warrant slow technological transfer of new GMOs. To recall the caricature illustrating the current situation from the introduction, the US has had its foot full on the gas, while the EU has had its foot on the brake. In very broad terms, then, patent laws, laws regulating the relations between public science and private enterprise, and the PP are the gas and brake, so to speak, of the genomic revolution. It follows that if policymakers want to affect the rate of technological transfer they should look at these mechanisms.
The second point is drawn from the summaries of the arguments for and against rapid technological transfer of the discoveries of plant genomics. It will be noted that the warrant for the arguments for rapid technological transfer depend on an optimistic interpretation of the history of technology in modern agriculture. In sum, scientific and technological progress has allowed agriculture to keep pace with population growth ('The humanitarian argument'), solve environmental problems created by this technology ('The environmental argument') and create wealth that has led to better health ('The economic argument'). It will also be noted that the warrants for the arguments against rapid technological transfer depend on a pessimistic interpretation of the history of modern agriculture. In sum, scientific and technological 'progress' has caused environmental degradation ('The Unintended Consequences argument') and has begotten a process in which small farms are replaced by environmentally harmful and economically unjust corporate monocultures ('The economic Justice Argument').
It is an interesting fact that there is compelling evidence to support all five warrants. One might speculate that legitimate but sometimes conflicting values are responsible for the different interpretations. While the summary provided here was terse and incomplete, it points to the idea that each of the five warrants has reasonable backing. However, these backings are constructed from a skewed and incomplete interpretation of history. So no one warrant alone supplies sufficient justification for action. Therefore, in a certain sense the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of the history of modern agriculture cancel each other out. Or more positively, each warrant provides a perspective that can be used to temper the excesses of focusing on one perspective alone, thus helping policymakers to ameliorate the present conflict over the role of GM in solving the problems of modern agriculture.
The third point has to do with how policymakers should deal with the 'unavoidable uncertainty' inherent in plant genomics. It will be recalled that it is not possible in practice to obtain accurate estimates of 'the probability and degree of harm, and value of compensating benefits' for any GM crop (Thompson, 1995, p.38) . Hence, we must deal with unavoidable uncertainty in technological transfer of transgenics. It follows that it is unfair to apply a strong version of the PP that asks developers to demonstrate that their innovation will not cause harm. This standard of proof cannot be met.
Nonetheless, we are not completely in the dark. It is reasonable to base decisions on hypothetical scenarios that predict the possible harms and benefits. Also, one way to think about this process is modelled in Figures 2 and 3 . With reference to these models, the PP serves to warrant a steeper slope for the 'line of decision.' Or, it can be used to force more innovations to be categorised as benefits rather than needs, thus putting more innovations on the J-curve in Figure 3 . According to this model, then, policymakers should first determine whether they are dealing with a need or a benefit. They must then find a way to judge if they are above or below the 'line of decision'. This would mean answering questions similar to the ones listed below. Some possible questions to determine risk:
• What are the hypothetical risks associated with this GM crop in this location?
• Are these scenarios reasonable and detailed or farfetched and sketchy?
• If the worst case scenario is realised are the consequences catastrophic, serious or mild?
• Are the negative consequences likely to be short term or long term?
• Who or what is at risk if the worst is realised? • Who will be responsible if the worst is realised? • How willing, resilient or vulnerable are the people, creatures, or ecosystems being placed at risk by this GMO in this place?
• Can regulation for this GMO in this place work in practice? • How will negative consequences be monitored and assessed? Some possible questions to determine need or benefit:
• Is this particular GM crop a need or a benefit? • Who should make this judgement?
• If this GMO is a need, who needs it?
• If it is a benefit, who will benefit? • What are the risks and costs associated with not using this GMO in this place at this time?
• What values do we wish to promote by going with this GM crop? Humanitarian?
Environmental? Economic?
• What kind of agriculture do we want to promote? One characterised by industrial agriculture, small farmers, or some kind of mixed system?
• How will positive consequences be monitored and assessed?
In conclusion, what is being advocated above is an incremental approach to GM policy. The role of policymakers in dealing with the uncertainties of plant genomics should not be to fully apply the gas and rapidly accelerate the GM revolution, as some US lawmakers would have it. Nor should it be to put the brake on full and bring the GM revolution to a halt, as some EU lawmakers would have it. Rather, the goal should be to regulate technological transfer in such a way that we move forward step by step, slowly at first and then gaining momentum as we gain experience. Thus, no sweeping judgements for or against GM should be made. Each new GMO should be seen as a new experiment that must be closely studied. Moreover, it seems reasonable that we should start with GMOs that meet the greatest needs and pose the lowest risk, until we have more experience. All this implies that we should not place all our eggs in the GM basket, which seems to be happening as funding for research in traditional plant breeding is drying up. It is certainly desirable to diversify agricultural research and practices. Finally, given the tremendous potential benefits of GM, but with a vast amount of unknowns, policymakers should resist the economically imprudent and environmentally dangerous 'gold rush' mentality of the 1990s technology boom.
